The scientific trend in Indian Philosophy

Earlier in the blog post 'Beginnings of Indian Atheism' i mentioned that the writer of the Svetasvatara Upanisad gives seven different views contesting the existence of God from different standpoints. One of these seven views is the view of 'Chance'; another is the the view of 'Nature' (svabhava-vada). This blog continues the classification given by Svetasvatara and the preliminary comments given earlier by going into the subject of the view of 'Chance' and the view of 'Nature' in some detail.

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In Indian philosophy, the doctrine of sheer chance (called 'yadrccha' or 'akasmikatva') is accepted by a section of the ancient Indian philosophers; according to this doctrine, pure accident is the ultimate cause.

On the other hand, we also have in Indian philosophy a description of a doctrine called 'svabhava-vada' which is translated as 'doctrine of nature' or 'naturalism'.

According to the doctrine of yaddrchha, everything being fortuitous, it is futile to search for any cause of the world, either natural or supernatural.

In contrast, according to svabhava-vada although the supernatural cause is illegitmate, the natural cause is not so. In fact,according to svabhava-vada, the exclusive reality of natural causation is the ground for the total rejection of the possibility of any supernatural causation.

The two doctrines thus represent the alternative standpoints of pure scepticism (yadrccha); and positive science(svabhava-vada) in which Nature by its own inherent efficacy accounts for the origin and maintainance of the world.(Or, in other words, svabhava-vada considers the concept of a first cause (God) over and above the natural laws to be fictitious.)

Incidentially, both yadrccha and svabhava-vada are described in the Upanisads, but as purva paksa (i.e. they are the views of the philosophical opponents of the Upanisadic writers. See the Svetasvatara Upanisad i.1-2 and vi.1)

Adi Sankaracharya, while explaining svabhava-vada and yadrccha, writes (in his commentary to the Svestasvatara Upanisad i.2):

By svabhava is meant the power invariably belonging to the material objects, as for instance the radiation of heat by fire....by yadrccha is meant purely fortuitous origin.



By far the clearest description of svabhavavada is to be found in the writings of the 14th century Jain philosopher Gunaratna. In his Tarkarahasyadipika, Gunaratna writes:

The naturalists (svabhavavadinah) claim as follows. By svabhava is meant the transformation of objects by themselves (i.e. because of their inherent nature). Everything that exists comes into being because of the operation of svabhava. Thus, for instance, earth is transformed into pot and not into cloth etc….From the threads, again, is produced the cloth and not the pot, etc. Such regular occurrence cannot happen without the operation of svabhava…Therefore, everything is to be finally viewed as svabhava. So it is said:

'Who makes the thorn sharp?
And the beasts and birds so varied?
All these come to being from svabhava.
There is none whose desire forms them;
what is the use of [postulating any supernatural] effort?'

'The thorns of the palm-tree are sharp,
Some of these are straight, some others
twisted. But its fruit is round.
Tell us, who has shaped these?'

Let alone the cases of other effects, even the boiling of beans (mudga) cannot occur without svabhava. Moreover, in spite of the presence of the cooking-pot, fuel, time, etc. the kanka-duka-mudga (stone chips resembling beans) cannot be boiled. Therefore, that in the absence of which something does not originate is related by ‘agreement in presence’ (anvaya) and ‘agreement in absence’ (vyatireka) to that something and hence that something is due to it. [In the presence of svabhava, something takes place; in the absence of svabhava, it does not take place. Hence, svabhava is the cause of it.] Thus the boiling of mudga is to be viewed as due to svabhava.Therefore, it is to be concluded that all these objects are caused by svabhava.


In his book 'Outline of Indian Philosophy' [pgs 103-104], M.Hiriyanna renders the word svabhava-vada as 'naturalism' and then observes that it rejects the idea that nature reveals a divine power working behind it or indeed any transcendental being controlling it or implicated in it; nor does svabhava-vada seek any supernatural sanction. He comments further that svabhava-vada recognizes that

'things are as their nature makes them... it acknowledges the universality of causality, but only traces all changes to the thing itself...hence, according to svabhava-vada, it is not a law-less world in which we live, only there is no external principle governing it. It is self-determined, not undetermined....What needs to noticed about it first is its positivistic character which is implied by the contrast that is sometimes drawn between it and the adrstavada or 'belief in the supernatural'.

From what we understand of svabha-vavada, in its earliest stage, it was apparently some form of an independent world-view without any rigid affiliation to any philosophical system. In the later development of Indian philosophy, such an affiliation grew amongst those philosophies which saw in its naturalism a distinct possibility of fortifying their own philosophical positions, particularly against the theists and their doctrine of the creation of the world by a divine agency. This is obvious in the case of Sankhya and Lokayata/Charvaka, and it can be argued that it was also the case for the ancient Indian atomists ; in all presumption, therefore, these philosophies were science-motivated.

In what follows, i wish to focus on svabhava-vada in Sankhya philosophy.Nilakantha, the traditional commentator on the Mahabharata, categorically declared that the doctrine of svabhava was that of the Sankhyas. Gaudapada and Vachaspati Mishra, in their commentary on the Sankhya Karika, also admit that that according to the Sankhyas there was a cause in the form of svabhava.

Adi Sankara clearly explained why this admission of cause in the form of svabhava was logically necessary for the Sankhya philosophers. These philosophers, said Adi Sankara, would have argued thus (Adi Sankara on Brahma Sutra ii.2,3 and ii.2,5; in what follows, pradhana= prakriti = primeval matter in Sankhya terminology)

As unconscious milk flows forth from its own nature (svabhavena eva) merely for the nourishment of the young animal, and as unconscious water, from its own nature (svabhavena eva) flows along for the benefit of mankind, so the pradhana also, though unconscious, may be supposed to move from its own highest nature (svabhavena eva) merely for the purpose of effecting the highest end of man....

Just as grass, herbs,water,etc. independently of any other instrumental cause (nimitta antara nirapeksa) transform themselves, by their own nature (svabhavat eva) into milk, so we assume, the pradhana also transforms itself into the Great Principle (Mahat) and so on. And, if you ask how we know that grass transforms itself independently of any instrumental cause, we reply 'Because no such cause is observed.' For, if we did perceive some such cause, we certainly should apply it to grass, etc. according to our liking, and thereby produce milk. But, as a matter of fact, we do no such thing. Hence, the transformation of grass and the like must be considered to be due to its own nature merely, and we may infer therefrom that the transformation of the pradhana is of the same kind.

Adi Sankara's own rebuttal of Svabhava vada is hardly satisfactory. Argues Adi Sankara:

grass becomes milk only when it is eaten by a cow or some other female animal, not if it is left either uneaten or is eaten by a bull. If the transformation had no special cause, grass would become milk even on other conditions than that of entering a cow's body

And further, that:

men are also able, by applying a means in their power, to produce milk from grass and herbs: for when they wish to produce a more abundant supply of milk they feed the cow more plentifully and thus obtain more milk from her.

In the arguments of Adi Sankara (in which he seeks to refute svabhava-vada), the crucial axiom of svabhava-vada has been somewhat distorted by him.

The question is, whether it is necessary to postulate any extra-natural cause, over and above the merely natural, to explain changes and modifications.The evidence of the necessity of the physiological apparatus of the female animal (for milk production) does not indicate any extra-natural cause.

From the point of view of svabhava vada, the cause of milk would not be grass as such but the entire natural complex consisting of gras-as-eaten-by-the-cow. Svabhava vada can only be refuted on the basis of the demonstration that some further spiritual factor is necessary for the causation of milk.

That men can get a more abundant supply of milk by feeding the cow more plentifully only proves that man can attain mastery over nature only by recognizing the laws of nature.

To sum up: The doctrine of svabhava remains of considerable interest because we see in it a distinct tendency to oppose the theistic assumption from the point of view of positive science. In the clash between the 'doctrine of God' and 'the doctrine of Nature' we have perhaps the first glimpse of the conflict between religion and science that took place in Indian history.